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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
1. Idaho Code § 19-3501. WHEN ACTION MAY BE DISMISSED 
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution or 
indictment to be dismissed, in the following cases: 
(1) .... 
(2) If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not 
brought to trial within six (6) months from the date that the information is filed with 
the court. 
(3) If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not 
brought to trial within six (6) months from the date that the defendant was 
arraigned before the court in which the indictment is found. 
Idaho Code § 19-3501. (EMPHASIS ADDED). 
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2. Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to a speedy public trial under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and under Article I, section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution. In Idaho, these constitutional provisions have been supplemented by legislation that 
sets specific time limits within which a criminal defendant must be brought to trial. State v. 
Clark, 135 Idaho 255,16 P.3d 931 (Idaho 2000); State v. Crockett, 37141 (IOCR), (Ct. App. 
2011 ); 
3. Under I.C. § 19-3501, criminal defendants are given additional protection beyond 
what is required by the United States and Idaho Constitutions. See State v. Brooks, 109 Idaho 
726, 728, 710 P.2d 636, 638 (Ct.App.1985). The statute mandates that unless the State can 
demonstrate "good cause" for a delay greater than six months, the court must dismiss the case. 
State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 16 P.3d 931 (Idaho 2000). 
4. Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's statutory right to a speedy 
trial presents a mixed question of law and fact. The Appellate Court will defer to the trial court's 
findings of fact if supported by substantial and competent evidence. See McNelis v. McNelis, 119 
Idaho 349,351,806 P.2d 442, 444 (1991). On appeal, an appellate court, however, exercises free 
review of the trial court's conclusions of law. See Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 
Idaho 185, 188, 814 P .2d 917, 920 (1991), and may substitute its view for that of the trial court 
on a legal issue. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255,16 P.3d 931 (Idaho 2000); State v. Moore, 148 
Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532 (Idaho App. 2010). 
4-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
5. When a defendant who invokes his statutory speedy trial rights is not brought to 
trial within six months and shows that trial was not postponed at his request, the burden then 
shifts to the state to demonstrate good cause for the court to decline to dismiss an action. State v. 
Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 38, 921 P.2d 206, 215 (Ct.App.1996). 
6. Good cause means that there is a substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal 
excuse for the delay. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887,231 P.3d 532 (Idaho App. 2010). State v. 
Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 260, 16 P.3d 931, 936 (Idaho 2000); State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 116, 
29 P.3d 949, 952 (2001); State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532,544 (Idaho App. 
2010);See State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 56, 58, 803 P.2d 557, 559 (Ct.App.1990); State v. Stuart, 
113 Idaho at 494, 496, 745 P .2d 1115, 1117 (Ct.App.1987). 
7. Analysis of whether there was good cause for a statutory speedy trial violation is 
not simply a determination of who was responsible for the delay and how long the case has been 
pending. Rather, the analysis should focus upon the reason for the delay. State v. Young, 136 
Idaho 113, 116,29 P.3d 949, 952 (2001). 
8. Because there is not a fixed rule for determining good cause for the delay of a 
trial, the matter is initially left to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 
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16 P.3d 931 (Idaho 2000);See Johnson, 119 Idaho at 58,803 P.2d at 559; Naccarato, 126 Idaho 
at 13,878 P.2d at 187; 
9. The ultimate question of whether legal excuse has been shown is a matter for 
judicial determination upon the facts and circumstances of each case. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 
255,260 16 P.3d 931,936 (Idaho 2000). See Johnson, 119 Idaho at 58, 803 P.2d at 559; Stuart, 
113 Idaho at 496, 745 P.2d at 1117. 
10. A trial judge does not have unbridled discretion to find good cause, and on appeal 
appellate courts will independently review the lower court's decision. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 
255,260 16 P.3d 931, 936 (Idaho 2000). See Johnson, 119 Idaho at 58,803 P.2d at 559; Stuart, 
113 Idaho at 496, 745 P.2d at 1117; Naccarato, 126 Idaho at 13, 878 P.2d at 187. 
11. There is an enormous difference between being inconvenienced and being 
unavailable. True unavailability suggests an unqualified inability to attend, while inconvenience 
merely implies that attendance in a case would be burdensome. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 
26016 P.3d 931, 936 (Idaho 2000). 
12. A defendant's right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right protected by the United 
States and Idaho Constitutions (and by I.C. § 19-3501). See Klopfer v. State of North Carolina, 
386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967); State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327,256 P.3d 735 
(Idaho 2011); State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117,219 P.3d 949,953 (2001); State v. Clark, 135 
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Idaho 255,16 P.3d 931 (Idaho 2000);State v. Crockett, 37141 (lDCCR), No. 37141 (Ct. App. 
2011);State v. Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474, 475,531 P.2d 236, 237 (1975). 
13. Under the Idaho Constitution the Courts have adopted the four prong balancing 
test used by the United States Supreme Court to determine whether a defendant has been 
deprived ofthe right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 256 P.3d 735 (Idaho 2011); State v. Young, 136 
Idaho 113, 117,219 P.3d 949, 953 (2001). 
14. The four factors to be balanced are (1) length of delay, (2) the reason for the 
delay. the reason for the delay, (3) the assertion of the accused's right to a speedy trial, and (4) 
the prejudice to the accused. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 256 P.3d 735 (Idaho 2011); State v. 
Crockett, 37141 (IDCCR), No. 37141 (Ct. App. 2011). 
15. In evaluating the reason for the delay, different weights are assigned to different 
reasons. United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315,106 S.Ct 648,656; State v. Moore, 148 
Idaho 887 (Idaho App 2010), 231 P. 3d 532,545. 
16. Although great weight is attached to considerations such as the State's need to 
collect witnesses, oppose pretrial motions, or locate a missing witness, and might justify delay, 
there is an enormous difference between being inconvenienced and being unavailable. True 
unavailability suggests an unqualified inability to attend, while inconvenience merely implies 
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that attendance in a case would be burdensome. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 26016 P.3d 931, 
936 (Idaho 2000);State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P. 3d 532, 545 (Idaho App. 2010). 
17. While a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hampen the defense is 
weighed heavily against the State, even a more neutral reason such as negligence or 
overcrowded courts falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable 
reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657, 112 
S.Ct. 2686,2693 (1992); State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 900, 231 P. 3d 532, 545 (Idaho App. 
2010); 
18. The length of delay and the nature of the case are also to be considered in what 
delay will be tolerated, for the period that is reasonable for prosecution of an ordinary street 
crime is considerably less than for a complex case. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 at 530-31,92 
S. Ct. at 2192-93; State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 900, 231 P. 3d 532,545 (Idaho App. 
2010);State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837,118 P. 3d 160, 169 (Idaho App. 2005). 
19. In the context of a constitutional speedy trial analysis, the defendant's assertion of 
his or her right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether 
the defendant is being deprived of the right. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 at 530-31,92 S. et. 
at 2192-93; State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 900, 231 P. 3d 532,545 (Idaho App. 2010). 
20. The interests that the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect include: (1) to 
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, and (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the 
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accused. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 333, 256 P.3d 735,743 (Idaho 2011); State v. Moore, 148 
Idaho 887, 904, 231 P. 3d 532, 548 (Idaho App. 2010). 
21. It is the state's burden to provide a speedy trial. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 332, 
256 P.3d 735, 743, (Idaho 2011); State v. Holtslander, 102 Idaho 306, 311, 629 P.2d 702,707 
(1981). 
22. Under the Idaho Constitution the period of delay is measured from the date formal 
charges are filed or the defendant is anested, whichever occurs first. State v. Folk, 151 
Idaho 327, 256 P.3d 735 (Idaho 2011)(citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,320,92 
S.Ct. 455, 463, 30 L.ED. 2d 468, 479 (1971); State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 118,29 P.3d 949, 
953 (2001); State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163,715 P.2d 833 (1986). 
23. A delay of 14 months is presumptively prejudicial. State v. Lindsay, 96 Idaho 
474, 531 P.2d 236 (1975). A delay of one year in robbery case is presumptively prejudicial. 
State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 160 P. 3d 1284 (Idaho App. 2007); a 13 mos. delay in a complex 
robbery case is presumptively prejudicial, State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29,34,921 P.2d 
206, 211 (Ct. App. 1996). 
24. Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests of the defendant which the right 
to a speedy trial is designed to protect. Those interests are (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial 
incarceration, (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) to limit the possibility 
of the defense will be impaired. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 
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L.Ed.2d 101, 117 (1972). See Clark, 13 5 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 
327,333, 256 P.3d 735, 743 (Idaho 2011); State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 904,231 P. 3d 532, 
548 (Idaho App. 2010); State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 118,29 P.3d 949,953 (2001). 
25. The reason for the delay cannot be evaluated entirely in a vacuum and a good 
cause determination may take into account the additional factors listed in. Thus, insofar as they 
bear on the sufficiency or strength of the reason for the delay, a court may consider (1) the length 
of the delay; (2) whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and (3) the prejudice 
to the defendant. However, the reason for the delay lies at the heart of a good cause 
determination under I.e. § 19-3501.Id. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887,231 P.3d 532 (Idaho 
App.201O). 
26. The ultimate question of whether legal excuse has been shown is a matter for 
judicial determination upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A trial judge does not have 
unbridled discretion to find good cause, however, and on appeal the appellate court will 
independently review the lower court's exercise of discretion. Id. It will first examine the reason 
for the delay and then address the remaining Barker v. Wingo factors as they apply to the case. 
State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532 (Idaho App. 2010). 
IO-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
27. In evaluating the reason for the delay, different weights are assigned to different 
reasons. United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,315,106 S.Ct. 648,656,88 L.Ed.2d 640, 
654 (1986); State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837,118 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct.App.2005). Idaho's 
speedy trial standards recognize that pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable. 
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647,656, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2693, 120 L.Ed.2d 520, 531 (1992); 
Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 P.3d at 169. Great weight is attached to considerations such as the 
state's need for time to collect witnesses, oppose pretrial motions, or locate the defendant in the 
event that he or she goes into hiding. Id. A valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve 
to justify appropriate delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192,33 L.Ed.2d at 117. 
28. However, there is an enormous difference between being inconvenienced and 
being unavailable. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255,at 260,16 P.3d 931 at 936 (Idaho 2000); 16 
P.3d at 936; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837,118 P.3d at 169. True unavailability suggests an 
unqualified inability to attend, while inconvenience merely implies that attendance at trial would 
be burdensome. Id. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532 (Idaho App. 2010). 
29. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should 
be weighed heavily against the state. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531,92 S.Ct. at 2192,33 L.Ed.2d at 
117; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 P.3d at 169. A more neutral reason, such as negligence or 
overcrowded courts, should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since 
the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the state rather than with the 
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defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531,92 S.Ct. at 2192,33 L.Ed.2d at 117; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 
118 P.3d at 169; State v. Wavrick, 123 Idaho 83, 89, 844 P.2d 712, 718 (Ct.App.1992). While not 
compelling relief in every case where a bad-faith delay would make relief virtually automatic, 
neither is negligence automatically tolerable simply because the accused cannot demonstrate 
exactly how it has prejudiced him or her. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657, 112 S.Ct. at 2693, 120 
L.Ed.2d at 531-32; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837-38,118 P.3d at 169-70. Although negligence is 
weighed more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused's defense, it still falls on the 
wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal 
prosecution.ld. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532 (Idaho App. 2010). 
30. Barker's four-part speedy trial test creates no bright line boundaries. Rather, the 
Supreme Court pointed out that because of the [231 P.3d 547] imprecision of the right to a 
speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke an inquiry into whether those rights have been 
violated is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. Barker, 407 U.S. 
at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2192,33 L.Ed.2d at 116-17. State v. ~Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532 
(Idaho App. 2010). 
31. The nature of the case is also of import in determining the period of delay that can 
be tolerated, for the period that is reasonable for prosecution of an ordinary street crime is 
considerably less than for a complex conspiracy charge.ld. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192,33 L.Ed.2d 
at 117; Lopez, 144 Idaho at 353, 160 P.3d at 1288; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 P.3d at 169; 
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State v. McNew, 131 Idaho 268, 272, 954 P.2d 686, 690 (Ct.App.1998). State v. Moore, 148 
Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532 (Idaho App. 2010). 
32. In the context of a constitutional speedy trial analysis, the defendant's assertion of 
his or her right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether 
the defendant is being deprived of the right. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. at 2192-93,33 
L.Ed.2d at 117-18. Failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that 
he or she was denied a speedy trial. Id. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193,33 L.Ed.2d at 117-18. State v. 
Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532 (Idaho App. 2010). 
33. That is, the timing of a defendant's assertion of the right tends to disclose whether 
a defendant actually desired a speedy trial, State v. Holtslander, 102 Idaho 306, 312,629 P.2d 
702, 708 (1981), and is closely related to and affects other Barker factors, including prejudice 
and reasons for the delay. Beck, 128 Idaho at 421,913 P.2d at 1191. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 
887,231 P.3d 532 (Idaho App. 2010). 
34. The fourth factor in the Barker analysis is prejudice to the accused caused by the 
delay. Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests that the right to a speedy trial is 
designed to protect: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and 
concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker, 
407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193,33 L.Ed.2d at 118; Young, 136 Idaho at 118,29 P.3d at 954; 
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Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354-55,160 P.3d at 1289-90. The third of these is the most significant 
because a hindrance to adequate preparation of the defense" skews the fairness of the entire 
system." Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193,33 L.Ed.2d at 118; Lopez, 144 Idaho at 355, 
160 P.3d at 1290. See also State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576,583,990 P.2d 742, 749 
(Ct.App.1999). State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532 (Idaho App. 2010). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was arrested October 28, 2009 at his home in California on charges from 
Idaho of statutory rape, and, after waiving extradition, was returned to Idaho. His initial 
appearance before a Magistrate was held November 12, 2009. Several scheduled preliminary 
hearings were continued by stipulation for various reasons, including awaiting results of DNA 
testing sought by the State to confirm paternity of a child presumed to be the Defendant's with 
the victim. The child was born and DNA samples were obtained in 
November, 2009, but the DNA test results took several months. On February 10, 2010, the 
Defendant waived his Preliminary Hearing and at that time was released to Pre-Trial Services --
after 105 days incarceration -- and he was then allowed to return to California. The Information 
charging the Defendant with two counts of statutory rape (Idaho Code § 18-61 0 1 (1 » was filed on 
February 16,2010. 
Defendant's arraignment, initially scheduled for February 24, 2010, was delayed until 
May 5, 2010. 
14-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
On May 5, 2010, the Defendant returned to Idaho for arraignment and pleaded not guilty, 
at which time jury trial was set for August 9, 2010. 
On July 28, 2010, appeared at the pre-trial conference in anticipation of trial set for 
August 9,2010. At the pretrial conference the State filed a Motion to continue the trial, citing as 
its reason: 
"[F]or the reason that the State's witness, Stacy E. Guess, Idaho State Police Forensic 
Scientist will be unavailable until March, 2011 due to being ordered to bed rest by a 
physician for the duration of her pregnancy due to complications and then will be on 
maternity leave.". ("State's Motion To Continue," July 28, 2010, R. Vol. I, p. 36. 
(original grammar and punctuation) (emphasis added». 
The Trial Court, recognizing a speedy trial issue, invited Defendant to waive speedy trial, 
but the invited waiver of speedy trial was declined (Tr. Vol. I p. 7 Ll. 1-6). Without a waiver of 
speedy trial the Trial Court granted the State's request for continuance: 
THE COURT: "Okay. I am going to grant the continuance. I am going to determine 
that we are delayed in this case as a result of trying to facilitate counsel's access to the 
evidence. The issue now has to do with the-frankly, with health the of the DNA 
specialist. And that's an appropriate basis to continue the speedy trial issue." (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 9, Ll. 3-9) (emphasis added). 
When advised the State's witness would not be available until March, 2011, the Trial 
Court requested the DNA be retested so another witness could appear for the State at trial: 
The Court: Do we know when she will be available? 
The Court: When is the baby due? 
Ms. North-Shaul: It indicates she will be unavailable until March of 20 11. 
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The Court: Oh, my goodness. 
Ms. North-Shaul: Due to being ordered to bed rest by her physician for the duration 
of her pregnancy. 
The Court: Then can't we have it retested? 
Ms. North-Shaul: We can. That's the only alternative. 
The Court: Let's do that. I'm not going to delay it that long without an 
agreement. Let's get it retested. 
Ms. North-Shaul: Okay. I will indicate that needs to be done. I think their testing 
window is somewhere between 60 and 90 days, though, so the Court is aware. 
The Court: We're not going to wait until March. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 9, Ll. 17-25; p. 10, Ll. 1-14.) (emphasis added). 
Granting the State's Motion For Continuance, the Trial Court instructed the prosecutor to 
include language in the Order that there was appropriate delay for speedy trial: 
The Court: You may want to redo that and just put in there that this is an appropriate 
delay under speedy trial issue." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 11, Ll. 25-17) (emphasis added). 
The trial was rescheduled to November 1, 2010. However, on September 16, 2010, the 
State filed a second Motion To Continue, which the Trial Court granted ex parte the same day, 
resetting the trial for January 24, 2011. The ex parte Order stated: 
"Based upon the Motion of the State, The Court finds appropriate delay under 
speedy trial issue due to Ms. Guess's physical health and the fact that she will not be 
back in the lab until January, 2011 and upon the Court's request the State 
resubmitted the DNA for retesting and was informed by the Idaho State Police 
Forensic Lab that they do not retest DNA and therefore the jury trial scheduled for 
November 1,2010, at 1:30 p.m., is hereby rescheduled to the 24 day of January, 2011 at 
1 :30 o'clock p.m. 
DATED this ~ day of September, 2010. 
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lsi John Shindurling 
Judge 
("Order To Continue," September 16,2010, R. Vol. I, p. 41) (emphasis added). 
Defendant neither consented or objected to this Order as it had been granted ex parte, and 
it appeared the Court was finding for a second time good cause for delay of speedy trial under 
Idaho Code § 19-3501. 
Upon notification of the second delayed trial, the Defendant repeatedly requested his 
counsel file a Motion To Dismiss due to lack of speedy trial (see, Tr. Vol. I, p. 12, Ll. 15-21; 
Vol. I, p.20, L1. 22-25, p. 21, L1. 1-5; Vol. 2, p. 28, L1. 20-25, p. 29,1-4); but relying on the 
specific language of the Trial Court at the pre-trial hearing on July 28, 2010, ("Minute Entry On 
Pretrial Conference," entered July 30, 2010, R. Vol. I, pp. 38-39) and the Trial Court's 
subsequent Orders on August 2,2010, ("Order To Continue," August 2,2010 (R. Vol. I, p.40) 
and September 16, 2010, ("Order To Continue," September 16, 2010 (R. Vol. I, p.44), 
Defendant's counsel did not do so, believing and advising the Defendant the Court had ruled on 
that issue (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, Ll. 15-21; Vol. I, p.20, L1. 22-25, p. 21, L1. 1-5; Vol. 2, p. 28, L1. 
20-25, p. 29, 1-4) 
Finally, at the pre-trial conference on January 12,2011, with the Defendant again present 
from California, at Defendant's urging Defendant's counsel filed a Motion To Dismiss for lack 
of speedy trial, advising the Trial Court of Defendant's prior requests and of counsel's reluctance 
to do so because of the Trial Court's previous rulings (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, Ll. 15-21). The Trial 
Court requested briefing and scheduled the matter for hearing on January 19, 2011. 
Simultaneous briefs were submitted ("Brief," R. Vol. I, p. 49, "State's Memorandum in 
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Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Speedy Trial," R. Vol. I, p. 82), along with 
Defendant's affidavit ("Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Dismiss," R. Vol. I, pp. 59-63) 
outlining the difficulties, stress and anxiety he had suffered awaiting trial. 
Although the Trial Court ordered on July 28, 2010 the DNA be retested to allow another 
witness to appear for the State at trial in November, the retesting was not done, and it was not 
until the pretrial hearing on January 12, 2011 that the prosecutor advised the Trial Court and 
Defendant the reason the DNA had not been retested was that the State Lab refused to retest the 
DNA: 
MR. PICKETT: We had the test already, Your Honor. It was the lab 
technician to testify. She had gotten pregnant and then had complications and 
was ordered to bed rest. She wasn't able to testify, and the State Lab would not 
retest the DNA. 
"THE COURT: The State Lab what? 
MR. PICKETT: Did not wish to to - they refused to retest the DNA, so 
we continued the trial until the 24th of January. Everyone is available on the 24th 
of January for the State." 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 13, Ll. 6 - 15 (emphasis added) (January 12,2011)). 
Likewise, at the hearing on Defendant's Motion To Dismiss on January 19, 2011, the 
prosecutor again advised the Trial Court: 
"THE COURT: Well, did they refuse just because they're being contrary, or did 
they refuse because it was impossible to do the sample again, or did they refuse just 
because they were too busy, or what's going on? 
MR. PICKETT: Well. It was based upon the fact that the-
THE COURT: I don't have any affidavits from the State Lab. 
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MR. PICKETT: I recognize that, your Honor, so basically - I mean based on my 
understanding, I can submit that, but it was based upon the fact they were down a 
scientist and they didn't have time." 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 22, Ll. 24-25, p. 23, Ll. 1-11). (emphasis added). 
As a result of this information, the Trial COUli took the matter under advisement, 
requesting the prosecutor to get a statement from the State Lab about its policy and requirements 
of retesting DNA in the case: 
"THE COURT: I had not considered the issue of the State's refusal. And frankly, I'm 
not willing to rule upon that without having additional information. So I am going to 
request - I am going to rule on this provisionally, but request the State to get some sort of 
statement from the lab as to what, number one, their policy and, number two, the specific 
requirements in terms of retesting in this particular case are." 
(Tr. p. 28, Ll. 8-16)( emphasis added). 
On January 24, 2011, the Court entered its provisional Order denying the defendant's 
Motion To Dismiss. (R. Vol. I, p. 92). Although not argued by the Defendant, the Trial Court 
found there had been no intent by the State to delay trial, but reserved ruling on whether there 
was "good cause" for delay of speedy trial, as Defendant had argued there was not "good cause", 
based on the State Lab's refusal to retest the DNA. The provisional Order read: 
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the above 
action is denied in part as to the State's intent to delay trial. The Court reserves its ruling 
on good cause as to the order for retesting of the DNA in the above action. 
Dated this 24TH DAY OF January, 2011. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 92) 
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IslJon J. Shindurling 
Judge" 
On January 21, 2011, in response to the Trial Court's request for a statement from the 
State Lab as to their policies and requirements of retesting the DNA, the prosecutor filed a 
"Notice Of Augmentation Of Record" (R. Vol. I, p. 87), attached to which was a letter dated 
January 19,2011 from the State Lab, as follows: 
"Dear Mr. Pickett: 
I am the DNA analyst that processed the evidence in this case. Due to a 
medical absence followed by maternity leave, I was out of the laboratory and 
unavailable between the dates of May 10 through November 12, 2010. On August 31, 
2010, Eileen Lawrence contacted the laboratory to request that the items in this case 
be retested due to my being unavailable to testify during that time frame. She was 
informed that, per our policy, the laboratory does not retest biologylDNA evidence 
and that, if necessary, the DNA analyst who technically reviewed the case would be 
available to testify to the results in my absence. 
As of November 15,2010 I am working full-time in the laboratory and 
am again available to testify to my results in the case. 
Sincerely, 
lsi Stacy E. Guess 
Stacy E. Guess 
Forensic Scientist II-Biology/DNA 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services" 
(R. Vol. I, p. 89)( emphasis added). 
After receiving a copy of Ms. Guess's letter attached to the prosecutor's Notice of 
Augmentation of Record (R. Vol. I, pp. 87-89), on January 24,2011 Defendant's counsel filed a 
Renewed Motion To Dismiss (R. Vol. I, p. 92), and on January 25,2011 the Trial Court entered 
its "Order Denying Motion To Dismiss" (R. Vol. I, pp. 94-95), stating: 
" ... Nonetheless, this Court finds that the action of the forensic lab was due to its 
policy, was in good faith, considering the limited resources of the lab and expense 
involved, and with Ms. Guest's (sic) report being available to all parties, the Defendant 
was not unduly prejudiced by the delay occasioned by Ms. Guest's (sic) medical 
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condition in light of Defendant's failure to claim any violation of speedy trial until 
just recently. Therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That Defendant's Motion To Dismiss be, and it 
is DENIED. 
CR. Vol. I, pp. 94-95) (emphasis added). 
lSI 
JON 1. SHINDURLING 
District Judge" 
Subsequently, on February 23, 2011, participating by telephone from his new home in 
Texas (having lost two jobs in California due to his initial incarceration and repeated trips to 
Idaho to appear in the proceedings, the Defendant had to relocate to Texas to find a job--See 
Defendant's Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Dismiss, R. Vol. I, pp. 59- 61)) Defendant 
entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of Statutory Rape, reserving his right to appeal 
the Trial Court's denial of his Motion To Dismiss for lack of Speedy trial. Defendant was 
sentenced on August 4, 2011 to three years confinement, fixed, followed by an indeterminate 
period of confinement of 12 years, with the Court suspending the sentence for 10 years and 
placing the Defendant on probation.(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 32). This appeal follows. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1) Was Defendant's statutory right of speedy trial denied? 
i) Is the analysis of a claim of denial of speedy trial the same under Idaho Code § 
19-3501 as a claim of denial under the Constitutions of the United States and the State ofIdaho? 
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ii) In determining "good cause" for delay of speedy trial under Idaho Code § 19 
3501, is a Court to use the same, any or all of the four (4) factors used in analyzing a defendant's 
Constitutional right of speedy trial? 
iii) In determining "good cause" for delay of speedy trial under Idaho Code § 19-3501 is 
"good faith" on the part of the State sufficient in delaying speedy trial? Is "good faith" 
equivalent of/or a factor in determining "good cause"? 
iv) What constitutes an assertion of speedy trial? 
v) Is a defendant's refusal to waive speedy trial an assertion of the right to speedy trial, 
in an analysis of "good cause"? 
2) Was Defendant denied his Constitutional right to a speedy trial? 
i) Is a refusal to waive speedy trial an assertion of speedy trial? 
ii) In analyzing a Constitutional right to speedy trial, maya Defendant be justified in 
delaying filing a Motion To Dismiss for lack of speedy trial, when the Trial Court has ruled that 
good cause exists in delaying speedy trial under Idaho Code § 19-3501? 
3) Is the analysis of denial for statutory right of speedy trial under Idaho Code § 19-3501 the 
same as for Constitutional right of speedy trial under the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of the State ofldaho? 
ARGUMENT 
Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states under the Fourteenth 
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Amendment (State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 332, 256 P.3d 735, 740) (Idaho 2011); (State v. 
Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117,29 P. 3d 949,953) (Idaho 2001) and under Article I, Section 13 of 
the Idaho Constitution. It is a fundamental right (State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 260, 16 P.3d 
931, 936 (Idaho 2000)) and also guaranteed under Idaho Code § 19-3501. (See, e.g. State v. 
Crockett, 37141 (IDCR 2011 )). The right to a speedy trial under Idaho Code § 19-3501 provides 
additional protection beyond what is required by the United States and Idaho Constitutions. 
(See, State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 260,16 P.3d 931, 936 (Idaho 2000); State v. Moore, 148 
Idaho 887, 899,231 P.3d 532, 544 (Idaho App. 2010)) 
Defendant alleges his right (or rights, if you would) to speedy trial, both statutory and 
Constitutional, have been denied, but analysis of each may involve separate considerations (See, 
State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 259, 16 P.3d 931,934 (Idaho 2000). 
Under the Idaho Constitution the Idaho Appellate Courts have adopted the four prong 
balancing test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, to determine 
whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States. (State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 256 P.3d 735 (Idaho 
2011); State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117,219 P.3d 949, 953 (2001). The four factors to be 
balanced are (1) length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the assertion of the accused's 
right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the accused. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327,256 
P.3d 735 (Idaho 2011); State v. Crockett, 37141 (lDCCR), No. 37141 (Ct. App. 2011). These 
same factors have been applied by the Idaho Court of Appeals in analyzing claims of denial of 
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the statutory right of speedy trial, but it is unclear if the same factors applicable to a 
constitutional challenge apply to a statutory challenge. 
IS STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF SPEEDY TRIAL THE SAME 
AS A CONSTITUTION ANALYSIS? 
In the case of State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 259, 16 P.3d 931, 934 (Idaho 2000), the 
Idaho Supreme Court questioned whether an analysis of statutory right to speedy trial is the same 
analysis ofthe Constitutional right to speedy trial, but leaving the question unanswered, and 
choosing therein only to define "good cause" (148 Idaho at 139,16 P.3d. at 935) for delay under 
the statutory right. 
Although it is clear the Barker factors are to be utilized in a Constitutional challenge to 
denial of speedy trial (State v. folk, 151 Idaho 327, 333, 256 P.3d 735, 743 (Idaho 2011); Stale 
v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 118,29 P.3d 949,953 (2001)), it is unclear (at least to this writer) if 
they, or some, or any at all, are to be used in analyzing a statutory challenge. As the Idaho 
Supreme COUli said in State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 260, 16 P .3d 931, 936 (Idaho 2000): 
"Whether a good cause determination under Idaho Code § 19-3501 contemplates 
an analysis of the factors enunciated in Barker, however, has been a point of contention 
in this Court for a number of years. As the Court noted some years ago in State v. 
Cotant, [one] might question why the Barker test is used to analyze statutory speedy 
trial rights when Idaho Code § 19-3501 mentions only "good cause." Cf State v. 
Hobson, 99 Idaho 200, 202, 579 P.2d 697, 699 (1978). Although the reason for the delay 
and prejudice to the defendant are logically relevant to whether good cause exists, the 
other two Barker factors are not. Nonetheless, we will adhere to recent precedent 
for the time being until this issue is squarely presented to us." 123 Idaho 787, 788, n. 2, 
852 P.2d 1384, 1385, n. 2 (1993). 
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In State v. Hobson the Court declined to apply the Barker factors to determine 
whether "good cause" existed for the delay in defendant's trial, stating that Barker v. 
Wingo ... is not applicable when Idaho Code § 19-3501 has been violated." 99 Idaho 
200,202,579 P.2d 697,699. Since Hobson, however, this Court has applied the 
Barker criteria to a dismissal request grounded upon a violation of the speedy trial 
statute. See State v. Russell, 108 Idaho 58, 696 P.2d 909 (1985); State v. Sindak, 116 
Idaho 185,774 P.2d 895 (1989); Cotant, 123 Idaho at 788,852 P.2d at 1385. As a 
result, trial courts and our Court Of Appeals have resorted to using the Barker 
factors to determine if "good cause" exists under the statute even ifthere is (1) 
precedent in State v. Hobson indicating that the Barker factors should not be used in 
cases involving a speedy trial claim under Idaho Code §19-3501; and (2) a reference 
in Cotant that at least two of the factors appear irrelevant to the discussion of 
whether "good cause" exists under the statute ... " State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 258, 
16 P .3d 931, 934 (Idaho 2000). 
Accordingly, it seems the issue remains whether Barker's four factors applicable to a 
constitutional analysis, some of them, or any of them, are to be used in determining "good cause" 
under Idaho Code § 19-3501. 
After Clark(id.), the Idaho Court Of Appeals has continued to apply the four factors of 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) to statutory challenges (See., e.g., State v Crockett, 37141 
(IDCR 2011); State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887,231 P.3d 532 (Idaho App. 2010); State v. Lopez, 
144 Idaho 349, 160 P.3d 1284 (Idaho App. 2007», presumably under license granted by the 
Idaho Supreme COUli in Clark: 
"Nonetheless, we will adhere to recent precedent for the time being until this 
issue is squarely presented to us. 123 Idaho 787, 788, n. 2,852 P.2d 1384, 1385, n. 2 
(1993)." State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 258,16 P.3d 931,934 (Idaho 2000). 
Because the statutory right of speedy trial has been held to be stricter than the 
Constitutional right (see, e.g. Clark, id;) , affording more protection to speedy trial (State v. 
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Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d. 352 (Idaho App. 2010), this brief will discuss defendant's 
denial of his statutory right first, considering, however, the same or some of the same factors of a 
constitutional challenge may be proper. 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS STATUTORY RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL 
Idaho Code § 19-3501 provides, as follows: 
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution or 
indictment to be dismissed, in the following cases: 
(1) .... 
(2) If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought 
to trial within six (6) months from the date that the information is filed with the court. 
(3) If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought 
to trial within six (6) months from the date that the defendant was arraigned before 
the court in which the indictment is found. 
STATUTORY TRIAL DEADLINE NOT MET 
Information against the defendant herein was filed February 16, 20 10, but his trial was 
twice delayed upon application of the State, and not finally scheduled until January 24, 20 11--
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eleven plus months later-- nearly twice the six month limit prescribed by Idaho Code § 19-3502 
(2); and defendant's plea of not guilty, entered May 5, 2010, was nearly 8 months before his trial 
was to begin, a violation of Idaho Code § 19-3501 (3). At no time did the defendant waive his 
right to speedy trial, but had refused to when invited by the Trial Court to do so at his pretrial 
conference on July 28,2010. Neither was it upon the defendant's application that his twice 
rescheduled trial was postponed. (Tr. Vol I, p. 7, Ll. 1-17). 
Each postponement of the defendant's trial was upon application of the State, each 
granted without defendant's consent or request, with the last continuance (September 16,2010) 
obtained by an ex parte application of the prosecutor ("Motion To Continue", September 16, 
2009, R. Vol. I, p. 42; "Order To Continue", September 16,2009, R. Vol. I, p. 48) without notice 
to or input of the defendant. With each continuance the Trial Court specifically found, sua 
sponte, "good cause" for delay of speedy trial. ("Order To Continue", entered August 2, 2010, 
R. Vol. I, p. 40; "Order To Continue", entered September 16,2010, R. Vol. I, p. 44) 
Because the defendant's trial was not "postponed upon his application" and the statutory 
deadlines of Idaho Code § 19-3501, were not met, it must be determined if "good cause" to the 
contrary [was] shown ... " (Idaho Code § 19-3501). For the reasons set forth hereafter it is 
respectfully urged "good cause" was not shown and that the Trial Court erred in its finding of 
"good cause," and its finding that the defendant was not "overly prejudiced" due to delayed 
assertion of speedy trial; and, accordingly, it is respectfully urged the defendant's conviction 
should be set aside and the charges against him dismissed, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-3501. 
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When a defendant's trial is not had within the statutory time lines prescribed by Idaho 
Code § 19-3501 and trial is not postponed upon the defendant's application, the burden shifts to 
the State to demonstrate "good cause." State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887,231 P.3d 532, 544 (Idaho 
App.2010); State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 38, 921 P.2d 206, 215 (Ct. App. 1996). 
"GOOD CAUSE" 
"Good cause," under Idaho Code § 19-3501, means there is a substantial reason that 
rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay. State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 116, 29 P.3d 
949,952 (2001); State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 260,16 P.3d 931, 936 (Idaho 2000); State v. 
Moore, 148 Idaho 887,231 P.3d 532 (Idaho App. 2010). State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 
P.3d 532,544 (Idaho App. 2010); See State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 56, 58, 803 P.2d 557,559 
(Ct.App.1990); State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho at 494, 496, 745 P .2d 1115, 1117 (Ct.App.1987). In 
turn, whether "legal excuse" has been shown, is a matter for judicial determination upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case (State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 26016 P.3d 931, 936 (Idaho 
2000). See Johnson, 119 Idaho at 58,803 P.2d at 559; Stuart, 113 Idaho at 496, 745 P.2d at 
1117.), 
ANALYSIS OF "GOOD CAUSE" UNDER IDAHO CODE § 19-3501 SHOULD 
FOCUS ON THE REASON FOR DELAY 
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113,29 P. 3d 949 (Idaho 2001), 
has stated: 
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"Analysis of whether there was "good cause" for a statutory speedy trial violation is not 
simply a determination of who was responsible for the delay and how long the case has 
been pending. Rather, the analysis should focus upon the reason for the delay." (136 
Idaho at 116, 29 P. 3d at 952)(italics added)(emphasis added). 
REASON FOR THE DELAY OF DEFENDANT'S TRIAL 
In exalnining the reason for the delay of defendant's trial herein, the State's stated reason 
in asking the Trial Court to continue the trial initially set for August 9, 2010 (and again from 
November 1,2010) to January 24,2011 was the unavailability of the State's DNA witness 
(because of pregnancy), alleging she would be unable to appear until the following March 
((2011)--which, according to the letter of Stacy Guess ofJanuary 19,2011, was inaccurate, as 
she indicated she was available as early as November 15, 2010) (R. Vol. I, p. 89). 
However, in reality the delay of Defendant's trial beyond the deadlines of Idaho Code § 
19-3501 was not unavailability of the State's witness, but the refusal of the State Lab to retest 
the DNA, ordered by the Trial Court on July 28, 2010. It is conceded if Ms. Guess were the only 
witness that could testify but couldn't; and if no one else could retest the DNA as had been 
ordered by the Trial Court; or if it could not be retested; and if the DNA was necessary to the 
State's case, the Trial Court's finding of "good cause" might be proper. But, the Trial Court 
having ordered the retesting to enable the State to obtain another witness for trial within the 
statutory deadlines, the State Lab's refusal to do so because of policy, it is urged, was neither in 
"good faith", nor was it, as the Trial Court found, a basis for "good cause." Simply put, the 
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"unavailability" of the State's witness was because of the State Lab's refusal to retest the DNA 
ordered by the Trial Court. 
The State Lab, being ordered to do so, could have and should have retested the DNA 
using other personnel, thereby availing another witness to the prosecution if they so desired to 
proceed using DNA evidence. The State Lab could have, was ordered to, but did not retest the 
DNA as ordered, according to the letter of the Lab submitted on January 21, 2011, (R. Vol. 1., p. 
89) because of policy. It is urged a defendant's fundamental right (State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 
255,261,16 P.3d 931,937 (Idaho 2000)) to speedy trial (as to Constitutional right) should not 
be denied because of State policy! 
The State Lab's refusal, the Lab being an arm of the State, is attributable to the State. 
This was not a case of unavailability, but of inconvenience to the State Lab. As the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated in the case of State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 260, 16 P.3d 931,936 
(Idaho 2000): 
"There is an enormous difference between being inconvenienced and being 
unavailable. True unavailability suggests an unqualified inability to attend, while 
inconvenience merely implies that attendance in a case would be burdensome." (id. at 
260,936). 
In this case, the State Lab chose not to retest the DNA because of policy. Again, 
quoting the witness (Ms. Guess) from the State Laboratory, " ... [S]he was informed that per our 
policy the laboratory does not retest biology/DNA evidence ... " (Letter, Stacy Guess, January 19, 
2011, R. Vol. I, p. 89)). 
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Also, in this case the DNA evidence was not essential to the State's case, but was 
cumulative, possibly conclusive, of the defendant's access with the victim. However, the State 
had other evidence to use against the defendant, including the victim's testimony and that of her 
family. The State could have proceeded to trial without the DNA evidence. 
BARKER FACTORS APPLIED TO STATUTORY CLAIM 
The Idaho Court appeals, in State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532 (Idaho App. 
2010), with apparent license of the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Clark, ("nonetheless, we 
would adhere to recent precedence for the time being ... ) 123 Idaho at 788, N. 2, 852p.2d at 
1385, N. 2) states: 
"[T]he reason for the delay cannot be evaluated entirely in a vacuum and good 
cause determination may take into account the additional factors listed in Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 u.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101,117 (1972). See Clark, 
135 Idaho at 260,16 P.3d at 936. Thus, insofar as they bear on the sufficiency or 
strength of the reason for delay, a court may consider (1) the length of delay; (2) 
whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and (3) the prejudice to 
the defendant. However, the reason for the delay lies at the heart of a good cause 
determination." (id. at 544)(emphasis added). (Moore 148 Idaho at 899, 231 PJd at 
544). 
The reason for the delay in this case was the State Lab refused to retest the DNA. 
It was not a matter of unavailability, but of inconvenience, as the prosecutor advised the 
Trial Court. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 13, Ll. 9-14; R. Vol. I, p.89). 
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THE LENGTH OF DELAY AND COMPLEXITY OF 
THE CASE ARE BALANCED IN ASSESSING PREJUDICE 
Consistent with the Court Of Appeals' decision in State v. Moore, (id.), the complexity 
of the case is a factor in determining the length of delay that is tolerable: 
"The nature of the case is also of import in determining the period of delay 
that can be tolerated, for the period that is reasonable for prosecution of an 
ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a complex conspiracy charge. 
Parkerv. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 117 
(1972); (additional cites omitted)" (emphasis added); State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 902, 
231 P.3d 532,547 (Idaho App. 2010); State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 353,160 P.3d 1284, 
1288 (Idaho App. 2007). 
Accordingly, it has been held a delay of 14 months is presumptively prejudicial. (State v. 
Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474, 531 P.2d 236 (1975)); that a delay of one year in a robbery case is 
presumptively prejudicial (State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 353, 160 P.3d 1284, 1288 (Idaho App. 
2007)); and that a thirteen month delay in a complex robbery case is presumptively prejudicial 
(State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 34, 921 P.2d 206,211 (Ct. App. 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL DELAY MEASURED FROM ARREST 
This was not a complex case, and the repeated delays of defendant's trial, it is urged, were 
presumptively prejudicial--and under a Constitutional analysis, where the period of delay of 
speedy trial is measured from the date of arrest (State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 332, 256 P.3d 
735, 740 (Idaho 2011) (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455,463, 30 L. 
Ed 2d 468,479 (1971)); State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 118,29 P.3d 949,953 (2001); State v. 
Stuart, 110 Idaho 163,715 P.2d 833 (1986)), of this there can be no question, as the 
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defendant's trial was not finally scheduled until January 24, 201 I-some 15 months after his 
arrest on October 28, 2009). 
DEFENDANT ASSERTED HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL 
Although it has not been fully answered whether an analysis of the statutory right of 
speedy trial is the same as for a Constitutional right, again, in State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 
231 P.3d 532, 547 (Idaho App. 2010), the Idaho Court of Appeals, analyzing therein a claim of 
statutory violation, stated: 
"In the context of a constitutional speedy trial analysis, the defendant's assertion 
of his or her right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining 
whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32,92 S.Ct. 
at 2192-93,33 L.Ed.2d at 117-18. Failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a 
defendant to prove that he or she was denied a speedy trial. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho, 
902,231 P.3d 532, 547 (Idaho App. 201 0). (emphasis added) 
Under Moore, then, the timing of the defendant's assertion of right to speedy trial is to be 
considered. In the instant case, in denying the defendant's Motion To Dismiss, the Trial Court 
cited what he perceived as the defendant's delayed assertion of speedy trial: 
"Nonetheless, this Court finds that the action of the forensic lab was due to its 
policy, was in good faith, considering the limited resources of the lab and expense 
involved, and with Ms. Guest's (sic) report being available to all parties, the Defendant 
was not unduly prejudiced by the delay occasioned by Ms. Guest's (sic) medical 
condition in light of Defendant's failure to claim any violation of speedy trial until 
just recently. Therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That Defendant's Motion To Dismiss be and it is 
DENIED." 
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DATED this 25th day of January, 2011. 
/ JON SHINDERLING 
District Judge 
"R. Vol. I, pp.94- 95" 
Assuming, Barker's four factors applicable to a Constitutional analysis of speedy trial is 
appropriate to determining a defendant's statutory right, it is respectfully urged the Trial Court 
erred in finding the defendant failed to assert his right to speedy trial until his Motion To Dismiss 
was filed in January, 2011. The Trial Court failed to consider the defendant refused the Court's 
invitation to waive speedy trial as early as July 28, 2010. (Tr. Vol. I p.7 Ll. 1-18). It is 
respectfully urged the defendant's refusal to the Trial Court's invitation to waive speedy 
trial, constituted an assertion of speedy trial at that time. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION WAS DELAYED BY TRIAL COURT'S 
PREEMPTIVE FINDINGS OF "GOOD CAUSE" 
It is also urged it was improper for the Trial Court to have found by the defendant's delay 
in filing his motion to dismiss, that the Defendant was not "unduly prejudiced." His reason for 
delay in filing was that the Trial Court had twice found "good cause" under the statute (R. 
Vol. I, pp. 42, 44.) thereby preempting a Motion by defendant. The defendant was entitled to 
and did rely on the State's representation of the unavailability of the witness and the Court's 
finding of "good cause", in delaying the filing of his Motion. 
Until the defendant was advised the real reason the State refused to retest the evidence, it 
was a matter of policy, and the Court having twice found "good cause", a motion to dismiss for 
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speedy trial was futile. Like the Trial Court, Defendant was not made aware until January, 2011 
(when he filed his Motion To Dismiss), the reason the State refused to retest the DNA was a 
matter only of policy. The defendant, like the Trial Court, was taken back: (The Court: "I had 
not considered the issue of the State's refusal. And, frankly, I'm not willing to rule upon 
that without having additional information." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, Ll. 8- 10)). This, coupled with 
the fact the Trial Court had twice ruled preemptively that "good cause" existed explains the 
defendant's failure to file a motion prior to January, 2011. 
PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT 
In denying the defendant's Motion To Dismiss, the Trial Court stated, 
"The Defendant was not unduly prejudiced .. .in light of Defendant's failure to 
claim any violation of speedy trial until just recently." (R. Vol. I, pp. 94-95). 
In State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532 (Idaho App. 2010), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals (citing the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 118,29 P.3d 949, 
953 (2001) and the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 
2182,2192,33 L.Ed.2d 101, 117 (1972), -- both involving Constitutional challenges to speedy 
trial)-- indicates how prejudice to the defendant is to be assessed: 
"The fourth factor in the Barker analysis is prejudice to the accused caused by the 
delay. Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests of the defendant which the 
right to a speedy trial is designed to protect. Those interests are (1) to prevent 
oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the 
accused, and (3) to limit the possibility the defense will be impaired. Barker v. Wingo, 
407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 117 (1972). See Clark, 135 
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Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 904, 231 P. 3d 532, 548 
(Idaho App. 2010) (emphasis added). 
It is urged the Trial Court, in determining the defendant was "not unduly prejudiced," 
failed to fully consider the actual prejudice deference suffered, both presumed and actual 
extended by the repeated delays of defendant's trial. 
That prejudice, including pretriai incarceration, the tremendous anxiety and concern he 
experienced, and the attending difficulties occasioned to defendant by the repeated delays of his 
trial, are outlined in Defendant's Affidavit (R. Vol. I, pp. 69) filed with his Motion To Dismiss. 
In his affidavit the defendant describes anxiety so bad he had to seek psychiatric help, of being 
diagnosed with Anxiety disorder, PTSD. Insomnia, OCD and depression disorder (See 
Defendant's Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Dismiss, January 18,2011, R. Vol. I p. 69); of 
losing two jobs and of becoming homeless with his family; having to relocate from California to 
a new home and job in Texas, and fearing its loss (he did); of six (6) trips to Idaho (to the point 
of his affidavit only). These are the things Idaho Code § 19-3501 was designed to minimize 
(State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 335, 256 P.3d 735, 743 (Idaho, 2011). In comparison, the 
inconvenience to the State Lab and its refusal to retest the DNA due to "policy"-no doubt due 
to inconvenience-- pales in comparison to the difficulties the defendant suffered caused by, 
extended or aggravated by the delay of his trial. They were not insignificant, and are exactly 
what Idaho Code § 19-3501 was designed to minimize. 
Not only should a Court presume prejudice due to the length of delay of the defendant's 
trial (State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 160 P.3d 1284 (Idaho App. 2007), the defendant's actual 
36-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
prejudice extended the delay (as indicated in his affidavit), should weigh heavily against a 
finding of good cause under Idaho Code § 19-3501, especially when weighed against the State's 
refusal to retest the DNA, "per [their] policy." 
It is respectfully urged, given the facts of this case, Defendant's statutory right to speedy 
trial was denied. 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO SPEEDY TRIAL 
For the same reasons the delay of defendant's trial violated his statutory right of speedy 
trial, his Constitutional right to speedy trial was also violated. 
A defendant's right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right protected by the United 
States and Idaho Constitutions (and by Idaho Code § 19-3501). See Klopfer v. State of North 
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988,18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967); State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 256 
P.3d 735 (Idaho 2011); State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117,219 P.3d 949, 953 (2001); State v. 
Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 16 P.3d 931 (Idaho 2000);State v. Crockett, 37141 (IDCCR), No. 37141 
(Ct. App. 2011 );State v. Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474, 475, 531 P.2d 236, 237 (1975). 
Under the Idaho Constitution the Courts have adopted the four prong balancing test 
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 
33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a 
speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. State v. Folk, 
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151 Idaho 327, 256 P.3d 735 (Idaho 2011); State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117,219 P.3d 949, 
953 (2001). 
The four prongs are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the 
assertion of the accused's right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the accused. State v. 
Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 256 P.3d 735 (Idaho 2011). 
In evaluating the reason for the delay, different weights are assigned to different reasons. 
United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315,106 S.Ct 648,656; State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 
887 (Idaho App 2010),231 P. 3d 532, 545. 
As previously argued, the reason for delay of defendant's trial in the instant case, 
amounted to inconvenience to the State Lab. The Trial Court ordered the DNA be retested to 
atIord the State the ability to have another witness testify and to protect the defendant's 
Constitutional right to speedy trial. The Lab refused, per their policy. It was not that they could 
not, but that they would not. Inconvenience to the State is insufficient to deny a defendant a 
fundamental right. 
As the Idaho Appellate Courts have stated, although great weight is attached to 
considerations such as the State's need to collect witnesses, oppose pretrial motions, or locate a 
missing witness, and might justify delay, there is an enormous difference between being 
inconvenienced and being unavailable. True unavailability suggests an unqualified inability 
to attend, while inconvenience merely implies that attendance in a case would be 
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burdensome. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 26016 P.3d 931, 936 (Idaho 2000); State v. Moore, 
148 Idaho 887,231 P. 3d 532, 545 (Idaho App. 2010). 
While a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense is weighed 
heavily against the State (Defendant does not argue such to be applicable herein), even a more 
neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts falls on the wrong side of the 
divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution. 
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657, 112 S.Ct. 2686,2693 (1992); State v. Moore, 148 
Idaho 887, 900, 231 P. 3d 532, 545 (Idaho App. 2010). Just as a crowded court falls on the 
wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal 
prosecution, so also is the lack of persOlmel, or a shortage of personnel by the State Lab. 
The length of delay and the nature of the case are also to be considered in what delay will 
be tolerated, for the period that is reasonable for prosecution of an ordinary street crime is 
considerably less than for a complex case. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 at 530-31, 92 S. Ct. at 
2192-93; State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887,900,231 P. 3d 532, 545 (Idaho App. 2010); State v. 
Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837,118 P. 3d 160, 169 (Idaho App. 2005). This case was not complex 
under any stretch of the imagination. It was a simple case. 
In Idaho it has been held a delay of 14 months is presumptively prejudicial. State v. 
Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474, 531 P.2d 236 (1975), and a delay of one year in robbery case was held to 
be presumptively prejudicial. State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 160 P. 3d 1284 (Idaho App. 2007); 
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and it has been held a 13 mos. delay in a complex robbery case was also presumptively 
prejudicial, State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 34, 921 P.2d 206,211 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Under the Idaho constitution the period of delay is measured from the date formal 
charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 
327,256 P.3d 735 (Idaho 2011)(citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 
463,30 L.ED. 2d 468, 479 (1971); State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 118,29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001); 
State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163,715 P.2d 833 (1986). Under these parameters it cannot be denied 
the delay was presumptively prejudicial, and under the facts stated in his affidavit, it was actually 
prejudicial. In the instant case the delay from defendant's arrest to the third scheduled trial was 
15 months. 
It is recognized in the context of a Constitutional speedy trial analysis, the defendant's 
assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in 
determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 
at 530-31, 92 S. Ct. at 2192-93; State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 900, 231 P. 3d 532,545 (Idaho 
App.2010). The defendant asserted his right to speedy trial when he declined the Trial Court's 
invitation to waive speedy trial; and his delay in filing a formal motion was due to his attorney 
(this writer) advising him the Trial Court had already ruled twice against him on the issue. It 
was further delayed by not knowing the true reason the State would not retest the DNA (and, 
therefore, the reason of the State's witness's "unavailability"), learning with the Court in January, 
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2011, shortly before the finally scheduled trial, the refusal of the State to retest the DNA was due 
to "policy." 
The interests that the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect include: (1) to prevent 
oppressive pretrial incarceration, and (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused. State 
v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327,333,256 P.3d 735,743 (Idaho 2011); State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 
904,231 P. 3d 532,548 (Idaho App. 2010). 
It is the state's burden to provide a speedy trial. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 332, 256 
P.3d 735,743, (Idaho 2011); State v. Holtslander, 102 Idaho 306, 311, 629 P.2d 702, 707 (1981). 
This was not done, and considering all of the Barker factors applicable to a Constitutional 
analysis of speedy trial, especially the reason for the delay herein, weigh against the State, 
whose duty it was to provide a speedy trial (id.). It is respectfully urged the Defendant was 
denied his Constitutional right to speedy trial, as well as his statutory right under Idaho Code § 
19-3501. 
SUMMARY 
It is the State's duty to provide a defendant with speedy trial under both the United States 
Constitution and the Idaho constitution. This Constitutional right has been supplemented by 
Idaho Code § 19-3501, which is a stricter standard than the Constitutional right. Because the 
State failed to afford the defendant a trial within the time limits set under Idaho Code § 19-3501 
and the trial was not postponed upon the application of the defendant, the burden shifted to the 
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State to show "good cause" for the delay. Whether "good cause" under the statute is analyzed by 
the same factors as a Constitutional analysis, remains unclear, but if so, the State did not show 
"good cause" in this case. The cause for the delay of Defendant's trial amounted not to the 
unavailability of a necessary witness, but a refusal of the State Lab to retest DNA after the Court 
ordered it to be retested in an effort to afford the State the opportunity to have a witness to 
introduce the State's desired cumulative DNA evidence at trial. Such refusal, based on policy 
(and not unavailability or impossibility), and the evidence not being essential, resulted in the 
repeated continuances and lengthy delay of the defendant's trial; and the State's refusal due to 
"policy" is not good cause. Had the State Lab retested the DNA as the Court had ordered, the 
State could have had a witness to testify in its behalf, and the long extension of the delays of 
defendant's trial would not have been necessary. 
The defendant asserted his right to speedy trial on July 28, 2010, when he declined the 
Trial Court's invitation to waive speedy trial, and it is not accurate that he failed to assert his 
right to such until late in the proceedings. Although he did not file a Motion To Dismiss until 
January, that delay was caused by 1) the fact he was not aware (along with the Trial Comi) until 
late in the proceedings the reason the State did not retest the evidence as ordered; and, 2) he 
relied on the fact the Trial Court had twice found "good cause" for delay of trial under speedy 
trial. With those findings and not knowing the reason the State did not retest the DNA it would 
have been futile to file a motion before he did. Accordingly, the Defendant's failure to file a 
Motion To Dismiss until January, 2011 should not be interpreted as a failure to assert his right. 
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Considering the reason for the delay (policy--not unavailability); the length of delay (15 
months from arrest to trial, 11 months from the filing of the information, and nearly 9 months 
from his plea of not guilty) ; the defendant's assertion of his right to speedy trial on July 28, 
2010; and, the presumed and actual prejudice the defendant suffered while awaiting his twice 
delayed trial (set forth in Defendant's Affidavit), there can be no question good cause was not 
shown under the statutory analysis, and that the defendant was also denied his fundamental right 
to speedy trial under the United States Constitution and the constitution of the State of Idaho 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this hday of February, 2012. 
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